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COMMENT
JUROR PRIVILEGE: THE ANSWER
TO THE IMPEACHMENT PUZZLE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to a jury trial, as embodied in the sixth and seventh
amendments to the United States Constitution,l is an essential part
of the contract made between citizen and government. One
staunch supporter called this right "the glory of English law ... [,]
the most transcendant privilege which any subject can enjoy or
wish for, that he not be affected either in his property, his liberty,
or his person, but by unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors
and equals."2 The jury trial has been praised not only as a means
necessary for the administration of justice, 3 but· also as an avenue
for the expression of public law. 4 Despite such praise, the jury trial
recently has come under increasing attack. Critics of the process
have found juries ill suited to handle the enormous volume of civil
litigation5 and much less competent than judges are at factfinding. 6
In the face of growing criticism, "a deep commitment to the use of
laymen in the administration of justice"7 has survived at least in
form if not always in substance. 8
If the jury process is to survive, its integrity must be pro
tected. While several procedures have been employed to assure
that the jury reaches a proper result, 9 little has been done to as
1. See u.s. CONST. amends. VI & VII.
2. 3 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 378.
3. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1875).
4. A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280-87 (Phillips Bradley ed.
1945). Some commentators believe that the doctrine of comparative negligence was
created by juries. Rather than hal' a contributorily negligent plaintiff recovery, juries
would consciously decrease the damages awarded. See Fleming, FalVlIr£i: CamplI/'({
tive Neglige/Ice lit LlIst--BIj judicilll Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 2:39 (1976).
5. See Peck, Do juries Delli!! justicei', 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956).
6. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 180-91 (19.30).
7. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JUHY :3 (1966).
8. The llse of judgments notwithstanding the verdict, FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), is
one example of-the preservation of the jury trial without regard to the verdict. Fur
ther examples are illustrated by a liberal view toward judicial summary and com
ments on the evidence.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 49 provides for special verdicts and general verdicts
accompanied hy answers to interrogatories. The use of the rule may he illustrated
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sure that the result is achieved through a logical process. Devices
used after a verdict has been rendered serve to check the jurors as
factfinders. 10 For example, both special verdicts and general ver
dicts accompanied with interrogatories are methods by which juries
particularize certain precise details of their factfinding. l l By con
trast, any attempt to monitor the process used by the jury to reach
a verdict is suspect because it challenges the presumption that the
discourse of twelve jurors will render a more just result than the
thought process of a single judge. 12
Tnlditionally, an attack on the verdict based on juror miscon
duct was combatted by the privileged communications rule. 13 Gen
erally, the privileged communications rule protects the votes and·
verdict deliberations of the jurors by affording them a privilege not
to disclose that information. Thus, juror affidavits or testimony are
inadmissible to impeach the verdict. 14 This rule has been under
going sustained and vigorous modification. 15 Thus, when a litigant
attacks the verdict because the jurors improperly reached the ver
dict either by casting lots or by accepting bribes,16 the juror privi
lege analysis has been excluded as a method for determining the
admissibility of a juror's testimony or affidavit.
Although no court or scholar has advocated the outright aban
this way: the court may ask the jury if they found the plaintiff contributorily negli
gent. In a state barring comparative negligence, the judge can assure a proper result
at law by receiving an honest answer to this question. See text accompanying note 4
supra. Another device used by the court is a poll of the jury to ensure that a unani
mous verdict has been reached when such a verdict is required by law.
10. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
12. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1875):
[tlwelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of educa
tion and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant,
the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their
separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a
unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great ef
fort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.

Id.
13.

See T.W. HUGHES, AN ILLUSTRATED TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVI
301-02 (3d ed. 1907).
14. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933).
15. See notes 139-144 illfra and accompanying text.
16. These are only two types of juror misconduct. Others include juror misuse
of evidence, misunderstanding the judge's instructions, and basing the verdict on
ethnic prejudice. See notes 149-53 illfra and accompanying text.
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donment of the privileged communications rule,17 the case most of
ten cited to support modification of the rule is Clark v. United
States .18 Though Clark easily might have avoided an explanation of
this juror privilege,19 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Supreme
Court, "[was] moved by the desire to build securely for the fu
ture. "20 By analogy to the attorney-client privilege, his opinion at
tempted to identify those circumstances in which the juror privi
lege applies. 21 This view, however, aimed at preventing judicial
shortsightedness, has left courts and commentators with a plethora
of ambiguous exceptions.
The availability of other exclusionary doctrines has contributed
to the demise of the juror privilege. 22 The cases since Clark gener
ally are satisfied to cite Clark as an explanation of the policy rea
sons for excluding juror testimony rather than as an exposition of a
principle available for application to a given case. 23 Certainly, Con
gress was moved to abandon the privilege notion at least partly by
the lack of a supporting body of American law. 24 In the absence of
any apparent legal support, the courts have relied on the imaginary
threshold to the jury room 25 and the vague notion of a juror's
"mental processes"26 to determine when to admit and when to ex
clude juror evidence to impeach the verdict. These bases are used
17. But see United States ex. rei Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). The court stated, "although what Wigmore
calls Mr. Justice Cordozo's 'eloquent exposition of the policy' of the supposed privi
lege in that case seems in fact to leave little but the name." Id. at 820 n.7.
18. 289 U.S. 1(1933).
19. The juror in Clark was not being questioned regarding the verdict. The is
sue in Clark centered on a bribe taken by the juror before she became a juror. Thus,
as to the central issue, no privilege could fairly be invoked. [d. at 17-18.
20. [d. at 19.
21. [d. at 15.
22. There are three other exclusionary doctrines. The parol evidence rule limits
any inquiry about the verdict to the'verdict itself, as the final written embodiment of
any previous discussions. See notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text. Lord
Mansfield's rule provides that a juror may not allege his own turpitude. Vaise v.
Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. (I T.R.) 944 (K.B. 1785). For an explanation of Lord
Mansfield's rule, see notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text. The third method
used to exclude juror testimony is public policy, most eloquently stated by Judge
Lamar in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1914). For an explanation of the
public policy exclusion, see notes 47-57 infra and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Government of V.1. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149 n.21 (3rd Cir.
1975); United States ex rei. Owen v. ~Mann, 435 F.2d 813, 820 n.7 (2d Cir. 1970).
But see Pessin V. Keenehmd Ass'n, 298 F. Supp. 593, 596 (E.D. Ky. 1969).
24. See text accompanying note 79 illfra.
25. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (note).
26. FED. R. EvIO. 606(b).
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in rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 27 They aptly
illustrate the widespread problems of definition encountered by the
courts when applying rule 606(b).28 The privilege doctrine, how
ever, still has some defenders.29 Ultimately, the policies articulated
in favor of the no-impeachment rule are those policies supporting
the juror privilege.
The no-impeachment rule, also known as the exclusionary
rule, is the modern method used to admit or exclude juror evi
dence. It is embodied in rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi
dence. 3o It is the thesis of this comment that the privilege doctrine
is the best method for applying this no-impeachment concept. Al
though commentators have recognized the privilege as an antiqua
ted exposition of policy, they have not attached enough weight to
the requisite components to establish the privilege. Where the
privilege exists, the effects of juror misconduct already have been
minimized. 31 Thus, privilege remains the sine qua non of an equi
table result. In short, the privilege doctrine furthers the interests
of fair trials and truth-seeking without retreating from a commit
ment to protect the integrity of the jury system.
Part II of this comment describes the historical foundation of
the juror privilege. This history will define the privilege and will
illustrate its usefulness. In part III, the privilege will be incorpo
rated into rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, thus
illustrating its effectiveness as the primary doctrine for applying the
no-impeachment rule. Finally, this comment will discuss the use of
the privilege to remedy any constitutional conflicts between the
sixth amendment and the no-impeachment rule.
II.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE No-IMPEACHMENT RULE

Lord Mansfield, in Vaise v. Delaval,32 articulated the principle
that jurors may not impeach their own verdict. Lord Mansfield ex
tended the maxim that "no person should be heard to allege his
27. [d.
28. See text following note 144 infra.
29. T. W. HUGHES, supra note 13, at 301; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2346, at
678-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
30. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
31. The privilege minimizes the prospective effect of juror misconduct by bal
ancing the harm of disclosure of juror evidence against the rights of litigants; the in
jury that would inure to the reh!tioll by the disclosure of the communications must
be greater than thf> benefit gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 8 J.
WIGMORE, sUp;'(I note 29, § 2346, at 688.
32. 99 Eng. Rep. (1 T.R.) 944 (K.B. 1785).
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own turpitude"33 to cover the case of alleged juror misconduct dur
ing the deliberations: 34
[tJhe court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jury
men themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high mis
demeanor; but in every case the Court must derive their knowl
edge from some other source such as some person having seen
the transaction through a window or by some other means. 3S

Before Vaise, common practice was to receive juror affidavits
alleging misconduct. 36 The Mansfield rule, although prompted by
policy considerations, was not described as a policy decision until
twenty years later. 37
Lord Mansfield's exclusionary rule was accepted widely in the
United States. The rule protected the secrecy of juror deliberations
and exempted jurors from liability for misconduct and improper
grounds for decision. Both interests protected by Lord Mansfield's
rule were regarded as "[h]ighly important to the independence and
freedom of . . . [juror] decisions."3s The Supreme Court demon
strated an early reluctance to bar all juror testimony concerning ju
ror misconduct. In United States v. Reid,39 the Court, while af
firming the lower court's refusal to accept juror affidavits of juror
misconduct,40 stated: "[i]t would perhaps hardly be safe to lay
33. The doctrine was used chiefly by Lord Mansfield to prevent drawers of
commercial paper from alleging usury as a defense. Walton v. Shelley, 99 Eng. Rep.
(1 T.R. 296) 1104, 1107 (K.B. 1786). To a lesser degree, the doctrine was used to bar
married persons from testifying to nonaccess in cases involving the legitimacy of
children. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. (2 Corp. 591) 1257 (K.B. 1777).
34. In that case, Lord Mansfield refused to entertain the affidavits of two jurors,
who alleged that the jury had tossed up to reach the verdict. 99 Eng. Rep. at 944.
35. Id.
36. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2353, at 697.
37. Owen v. Warburton, 127 Eng. Rep. (1 B.P.N.R. 326) 489, 491 (C.P. 1805). In
this case Lord Mansfield said:
[t]he affidavit of a juryman cannot be received. It is singular indeed that al
most the only evidence of which the case admits should be shut out; but,
considering the arts which might be used if a contrary rule were to prevail,
we think it necessary to exclude such evidence. If it were understood to be
the law that a juryman might set aside a verdict by such evidence, it might
sometimes happen that a juryman, being a friend to one of the parties, and
not being able to bring over his companions to his opinion, might propose a
decision by lot, with a view afterwards to set aside the verdict by his own
affidavit, if the decision should be against him.
Id.
38. Hannum v. Belchertown, 37 Mass. (19 Pick.) 311 (1837).
39. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
40. The Court was willing to accept a juror affidavit which alleged that a news
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down any general rule upon this subject. Unquestionably, such ev
idence ought always to be received with great caution. But cases
might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse [affidavits]
without violating the plainest principles of justice. "41 The judici
ary has followed the sentiment expressed in Reid and has devel
oped exceptions to Lord Mansfield's strict rule. 42 The exceptions
permit a juror to testify to certain kinds of misconduct, notably
matters that do, not "inhere in the verdict."43 Juror testimony,
however, still remains the exception to the majority rule barring
juror impeachment of the verdict. 44
The early American repudiation of the rigid Mansfield rule
forced the judiciary to articulate a different basis for its new rule.
Essentially, Lord Mansfield's total bar to juror impeachment came
to reflect a trio of considerations necessary for a just decision. 45
Public policy, the parol evidence rule, and juror privilege combine
to form these considerations. Modem case law in this area has
relied largely on public policy with little or no attention to the
other two doctrinal foundations of the rule. 46

A.

Public Policy

Originally, the public policy argument focused on protecting
the privacy of the jury. The Supreme Court, in McDonald v.
Pless,47 set out these policy rationales:
[b]ut let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and
publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the
paper article, not entered into evidence, had been considered by the jury, but had
not prejudiced the juror. [d. at 366.
41. [d.
42. Ten states do not follow the Mansfield rule, but have developed variations
of it. These include Iowa and Ohio. A growing list of states, currently 17, have
adopted comprehensive codes of evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See M. BERGER & J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 606 (Supp. 1979).
43. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866). See note 60
infra.
44. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915).
45. Dean Wigmore noted:
[b]ut this rule of thumb [a juror may not impeach his own verdict] is in itself
neither strictly correct as a statement of the acknowledged law nor at all de
fensible upon any principle in this unqualified form. It is a mere shibboleth
and has no intrinsic significance whatever. It has reference to a group of
rules deducible from three general and independent principles which must
be examined separately.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2346, at 677.
46. See text accompanying note 141 infra.
47. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
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testimony of those who took part in their publication and all ver
dicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in
the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the
finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated
party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which
might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If ev
idence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to
make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the con
stant subject of public investigation-to- the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference. 48

Both courts 49 and commentators 50 have recognized that perfect
jury performance is impossible. Shielding the jury from external in
fluences, however, remains critical in protecting the less-than
absolute integrity of the jury system. The no-impeachment rule ac
complishes this goal in two ways. The rule disallows constant
public scrutiny of jury verdicts, thereby fostering free and frank
discussion. 51 In fact, the judiciary usually chooses to protect the
jury rather than to redress a private litigant's injury when an unfa
vorable verdict has been rendered due to juror misconduct. 52 Sec
48. Id. at 267-68.
49. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority of the Second Circuit stated:
it would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute perfection that
no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been entirely without bias, and
has based his vote only upon evidence he has heard in court. It is doubtful
whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would stand such a test; and
although absolute justice may require as much, the impossibility of
achieving it has induced judges to take a middle course, for they have recog
nized that the institution could not otherwise survive....
Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d CiL), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 764 (1947).
50. F. JAMES & C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 71.9, at 310-11 (2d ed. 1977).
If it is true-as it well may be-that few verdicts could withstand a test
which rigorously requires every juryman to perform his function ideally,
then the system should not be preserved by forcibly concealing that fact.
Rather, it should be justified on other grounds which admit this truth and
see value in popular participation in the judicial process, in the good sense
of the overall view of the dispute formed collectively by a group of laymen,
or even in taking into account the community's sense of justice-of what the
law ought to be and sometimes is not.
51. 2.38 U.S. at 267. See Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 7.39 (4th CiL), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 836 (1948).
If jurors are conscious that they will be subjected to interrogation or search
ing hostile inquiry as to what occured in the jury room and why, they are al
most inescapably influenced to some extent by that anticipated annoyance.
The courts will not permit that potential influence to invade the jury room.
Id. at 745.
52. 238 U.S. at 267.
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ond, the exclusionary rule reduces the opportunities for third-party
tampering with the jury. 53 An unsure juror cannot become the
pawn of a defeated party seeking reversal of the verdict. 54 The rule
minimizes the ability of a third party to corrupt the juror and
thereby influence postverdict juror testimony. 55
Concurrent with protection of the jury is protection of the ver
dict. The right of litigants to finality in their litigation presupposes
a verdict not subject to appeal or collateral attack based on allega
tions of juror misconduct. 56 Further, "the courts ought not to be
burdened with large numbers of applications mostly without real
merit ... [;] verdicts ought not to be so uncertain. "57
While the no-impeachment rule was based on the public pol
icy rationales discussed above, the exceptions to the rule were
grounded in other, conflicting policy rationales. The first significant
modification of the Mansfield rule was articulated by the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Wright v. Illinois and Mississippi Telegraph Co. 58
The new rule would permit the court to consider juror affidavits

53. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142-43 (1892) (bailiff's comments to
the jury and a newspaper article circulated among the jury in a murder trial were ad
mitted to impeach the verdict); United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977) (affidavit by juror that during trial he real
ized that defendant was one of the men wanted in connection with shooting of two
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents was incompetent to impeach the verdict);
Government of V.1. V. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 917 (1976) (conversation between juror and matron could be proved by juror as
extraneous influence); United States V. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 868-69 n.3 (5th Cir.
1975) (reversing denial of new trial motion based upon affidavit by one juror that an
other had stated that defendant had been in trouble two or three times before);
Miller V. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968) (affirming injunction against'
ex parte interviews conducted on behalf of parties with jurors).
54. Mueller, Juror's Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal
Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920,924 (1978). See also United States v.
Chereton, 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963) (court prop
erly refused to examine jurors following the submission of affidavits by four jurors
two years after the trial alleging that the defendant had been convicted on the wrong
charges).
55. Hyde V. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 382-84 (1912) (court refused to con
duct juror examination regarding a compromise verdict); Mattox V. United States, 146
U.S. 140, 148 (1892). See also note 37 supra.
56. Note, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors-Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 442 (1978).

57. United States V. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 984 (1962) (proof that juror erroneously considered guilt of one codefendant was
rejected).
58. 20 Iowa 195 (1866). The uncontradicted affidavits of four· jurors stated that
the jury's verdict in this tort action was a quotient verdict.
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concerning matters that did not "inhere in the verdict itself,"59
facts independent of the verdict. The juror's personal impressions
were inadmissible while communications from third parties to ju
rors were admissible. 60 The court rested its unprecedented deci
sion on several grounds. Facts independent of the verdict are sus
ceptible to corroboration by the other jurors, and thus the
testimony of one juror cannot disturb the verdict rendered by
twelve. Obviously, the personal impressions of a juror cannot be
corroborated. 61 The Wright court also rejected the hypocrisy of
Lord Mansfield's approach, which allowed the court to receive an
eavesdropper's rather than the juror's testimony. 62 Finally, implicit
in the court's decision was the elevation of a policy protecting indi
vidual litigants above the policy supporting jury protection:
[aJ juror should not be heard to contradict or impeach that
which, in the legitimate discharge of his duty, he has solemnly
asseverated. But when he has done an act entirely independent
and outside of his duty and in violation of it and the law, there
can be no sound public policy which should prevent a court from
hearing the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible, in
order to administer justice to the party whose rights have been
prejudiced by such unlawful act. 63

This liberal minority view has transformed the issue of juror im
peachment into a battle between conflicting interests. The Iowa
formulation 64 has found some support in various arenas. 65 The
United States Congress, however, flatly rejected the Iowa approach
as the uniform rule when it was proposed by the House during the
hearings on rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 66 Fur
ther, one state, after careful consideration, rejected the Iowa rule,
59. Id. at 210.
60. Id. The court mentioned several instances in which the affidavits of jurors
would involve matters that "inhere in the verdict": (1) Failure of a juror to assent to
the verdict; (2) misunderstanding the court's instructions or the testimony or plead
ings; (3) undue influence experienced by one juror from coercion by another; and (4)
mistakes in a juror's calculations or judgment.
61. Id. at 211.
62. Id. at 211-12.
63. Id. at 212.
64. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
65. The Iowa rule is followed in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.607(2)(b) (West
1979) and Kansas, KAN. STAT. § 60-444(a) (1976). The rule has' also been incorpo
rated in the MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 301 (1942) and the UNIFORM R. OF EVID. 41
(1953).
66. See text accompanying notes 122-126 infra.
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believing that "any abrogation or modification of the [Mansfield]
rule would entail far worse consequences than its enforcement. "67
The public policy rationale is a double-edged sword; both sup
port for private litigants and protection of the jury system, mutu
ally exclusive goals, may be articulated in public policy terms.
Merely balancing one against the other begs the question. Surely,
the flexibility of such an approach is warranted, but the dubiety of
decision, coupled with the flimsiness of legal precedent and reason
ing, forms a weak base for a juror impeachment rule.

B.

Parol Evidence Rule

The second principle supporting the modem exclusionary rule
is the parol evidence doctrine:
[t]he principle is that where the existence and tenor of the jural
act-i. e., an utterance to which legal effects are attached-are in
issue, the outward utterance as finally and formally made, and
not the prior and private intention, is taken as exclusively
constituting the act . . . and therefore where the act is required
... to be made in writing, the writing is the act. . .. 68

Thus, the jury's final utterance in writing, the verdict, is the act.
The jury's discussions and deliberations, much like prior contract
negotiations, cease to have legal significance once the final agree
ment takes written form. 69 The verdict becomes "the sole embodi
ment of the jury's act"70 and "the best evidence of . . . [its] be· f "71
l Ie.
Little weight has been attached to this supporting notion for
the exclusionary rule. The inherent weakness in the argument con
cerns the relationship between the parties. In a contractual setting,
the parties negotiating the agreement are the parties ultimately
bound by the contract. In the case of a jury verdict, however, the
party bound by the verdict is not a negotiating party but is the de
fendant, a third party. Some courts recognize the potential for
harm to innocent third parties and allow juror evidence to explain
the verdict. 72
67. Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio 235, 242, 187 N.E. 862, 868 (1933) (juror affida
vits stating that bailiff led them to believe that judge wanted a guilty verdict and that
they would be sequestered if they failed to reach a verdict were admissible).
68. 8]. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2348, at 679.
69. See]. CALAMARI & ]. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 40 (1970).
70. 8]. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2349, at 681.
71. Murdock v. Sumner, 39 Mass, (22 Pick.) 156, 157 (1839).
72. In re Sugg, 194 N.C. 638, 643, 140 S.E. 604,606 (1927).
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Privilege

The privilege doctrine, as noted earlier, has received little rec
ognition as a foundation for the modern exclusionary rule. 73 The
doctrine suggests that the jury's deliberations are protected from
disclosure unless the privilege is waived. 74 The courts have not
rested their juror impeachment decisions on the privilege concept.
Its mention in dictum, however, suggests the important tradition of
the doctrine. 75 Four elements are required to establish the privi
lege:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the comnlU
nity ought to be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal at litigation. 76

Although the public policy factors supporting the privilege
have been given central importance in the area of juror impeach
ment, the privilege alone has not been perceived as sufficiently
crucial to justifY the modern exclusionary rule. 77 This lack of recog
nition is probably due to an "inveterate but vague tradition. "78
III.

A.

THE MODERN EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Federal Judicial Response

Like the state courts, the federal courts lacked a comprehen
sive body of case law to support their juror impeachment decisions.
Four Supreme Court cases decided over a period of sixty years did
not clarify the subject. 79
73. See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text.
74. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2346, at 678-79.
75. Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 460 (1871); Matter of Cochran, 237
N.Y. 336, 340, 143 N.E. 212, 213 (1924).
76. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis deleted).
77. Carlson & Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revision,
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247,253 (1977).
78. 289 U.S. at 13.
79. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1914); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S.
347 (1911); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S.
361 (1865).

458

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND

[Vol. 3:447

The initial Supreme Court confrontation with the issue of juror
impeachment in United States v. Reid 80 demonstrated an early re
luctance to set down a general rule. 81 In Reid, the Court found it
unnecessary to establish a general rule because "we are of [the]
opinion that the facts proved by the jurors, if proved by unques
tioned testimony, would be no ground for a new trial."82
The Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States 83 merely
added to the confusion by promulgating standards for decision
without regard to the scope of these standards. The case concerned
a murder conviction which was appealed because of the bailiff's
comments to the jury and the circulation among the jurors of a
newspaper account of the trial. 84 The Court labeled affidavits
disclosing these events as admissible because they concerned an
"extraneous influence"85 and found affidavits which "inhere in the
verdict" to be inadmissible. 86 The Court relied on two state su
preme court decisions87 which added no new substantive dimen
sion to the law. Mattox merely emphasized the virtue of the cor
roboration elementB8 when juror misconduct was based on overt
acts. 89
The Supreme Court declined two new opportunities to com
plete the central task of defining the standards called "extraneous
influence" and "inhere in the verdict." In Hyde v. United States,90
the Court affirmed the lower court's denial of a juror examination
regarding a compromise verdict91 by relying on the "inhere in the
verdict" standard. 92 The Court was presented with a second oppor
tunity in McDonald v. Pless, 93 a case involving a quotient ver
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851).
See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
53 U.S. at 366.
146 U.S. 140 (1892).
Id. at 142-44.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453

85.
86.
87.
(1871).
88. 146 U.S. at 149.
89. Id.
90. 225 U.S. 347 (1911).
91. A compromise verdict is: "One which is reached only by the surrender of
conscientious convictions on one material issue by some jurors in return for a relin
quishment of matters in their like settled opinion on another issue, and the result is
one which does not hold the the approval of the entire panel." BLACK'S LAW Drc
TIONARY 250 (5th ed. 1979).
92. 225 U.S. at 383-84.
93. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
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dict. 94 Again, the Court declined to draw some boundaries for its·
new terms of art:
without attempting to define the exceptions, or to determine
how far such evidence might be received by the judge on his
own motion, it is safe to say that there is nothing in the nature
of the present case warranting a departure from what is unques
tionably the general rule, that the losing party cannot, in order
to secure a new trial, use the testimony of jurors to impeach
their verdict. 95

The Court concluded that only in the "gravest and most important
cases"96 should the rule be violated. The Court's articulation of the
strong public policy reasons for protecting the jury,97 coupled with
the Court's reference to a legislative reluctance to modify or repeal
the law,98 places Mattox in a dubious posture. Allowing jurors to
impeach their verdict only in grave and important cases99 probably
has much more to do with the capital nature of Mattox 100 than it
has to do with that particular brand of juror misconduct. 101 Thus,
any reliance on Mattox for the proposition that the Supreme Court
approves of the standards "inhere in the verdict" or "extraneous in
fluence" is questionable.
The Supreme Court used a different approach to the juror im
peachment problem in Clark v. United States .102 For the first
time, using a helpful analogy to the attorney-client privilege,103 the
Supreme Court articulated a juror privllege and an exception to
that privilege:
[fJor the origin of the privilege we are referred to ancient usage,
and for its defense to public policy. Freedom of debate might be

94. A quotient verdict is "one resulting from agreement whereby each juror
writes down the amount of damages to which he thinks the party is entitled and such
amounts are then added together and divided ,by the number of jurors," BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (5th ed. 1979).
95. 238 U.S. at 269.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 267. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
98. 238 U.S. at 268.
99. Id. at 269.
100. In Mattox, the defendant was on trial for murder. 146 U.S. at 141.
101. The jurors alleged that the bailiff had made questionable comments to the
jury during deliberations, and also alleged that a newspaper account of the trial, not
entered into evidence, had been circulated among them prior to their reaching a ver
dict. Id. at 142-43.
102. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
103. Id. at 15.
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stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made
to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely pub
lished in the world. The force of these considerations is not to
be gainsaid. But the recognition of a privilege does not mean it
is without conditions or exceptions. 104

The privilege was found not to exist in Clark because the juror was
deceitful on voir dire, thereby violating the postulate of the privi
lege of a "genuine relation, honestly created and honestly main
tained. "105 This case represents the Rnal Supreme Court word on
the issue of juror impeachment before the enactment of rule 606(b)
and has been cited with approval since Clark in criminap06 and
civipo7 cases alike.

B.

Federal Legislative Response

Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. Rule
606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is the federal codillcation
of the common-law exclusionary rule:
[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon. his or any other juror's mind or emotions
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indict
ment or concerning his mental processes in connection there
with, except that a juror may testify on the question whether ex
traneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jUry's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may this affidavit or evi
dence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which
he would be precluded from testifying be received for these pur
poses.lOS

The confused state of juror impeachment law prior to the enact
ment of rule 606(b) resulted ina House-Senate battle regarding
what the rule should be. Thus, the legislative history of rule 606(b)
104. [d. at 13.
105. [d. at 14.
106. Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949) (case involved crimi
nal conspiracy).
107. Pessin v. Keeneland Ass'n, 298 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Ky. 1969); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) [hereinafter referred to as Rule 606(b)1. Rule 606(b)
was amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, § 1(10), 89 Stat. 805
(1975), which substituted "which" for "what" in the last sentence as a technical cor
rection.
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is more an explanation of what the rule is not rather than what the
rule is.
The Advisory Committee's initial construction of rule 606(b)
embodied a broader exclusionary principle. lo9 Although the lan-·
guage conformed to the language of the present rule, the applica
tion was significantly different. The advisors believed that the Iowa
rule llo represented the trend toward the exclusionary rule. III Ac
cordingly, jurors were precluded from testifying about "the effect
of anything upon the juror's mind or emotions"; and jurors were al
lowed to testify about any act or statement occurring during the
deliberations. 112 The fInal draft forwarded by the Advisory
Committee to the Supreme Court, however, was modifIed to re
flect the majority sentiment, which barred juror testimony about
matters that occur during deliberation. 113
These modifications were prompted by concern over the jury
verdict's vulnerability to attack1l4 and fear of undue harassment of
jurors. 1l5 Essentially, conflict arose over two issues: First, inquiry
into what happens in the jury room;1l6 and second, the Advisory
109. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other ju
ror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (Prelim. Draft Mar. 31, 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161,
289-90 (1969).
110. See notes 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
111. H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974), reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 247-48 (1975).
112. Id.
113. The majority rule in the United States was not the Iowa rule, but a nar
rower rule which barred juror testimony about statements which occurred during de
liberations.
114. Letter of Aug. 12, 1971, Sen. McClellan to Judge Maris, 117 Congo Rec.
33,642,33,645 (1971).
115. See Letter of Aug. 9, 1971, Dep. Att'y Cen. Richard C. Kleindienst to
Judge Maris, 117 Congo Rec. 33,648 (1971).
116. [A]s I read the present draft of Rule 606, it would go further and per
mit the impeachment of verdicts by inquiry. into, not the mental processes
themselves, but what happened in terms of conduct in the jury room.
The mischief in this Rule ought to be plain for all to see. Judges need not
explain their verdicts beyond the judgment and the opinion. Were it possi
ble to overturn a decision because, in fact, it was not based on precedent,
but bias, and this was an issue that could be litigated, it would indeed be
brought before the courts. Present law, as I read it, wisely prohibits this sort
of inquiry before it starts with jurors as it is unthinkable with judges ... I
do not believe it would be possible to conduct trials, particularly criminal
prosecutions, as we know them today, if every verdict were followed by a
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Committee's acceptance of the Iowa formuiation U7 as the majority
rule. u8 The Committee's final draft barred juror evidence that
concerned the effect of anything on a juror's mind or emotion, his
mental processes, as well as testimony about any matter or state
ment made during the jury deliberations. u9 Jurors were permitted
to testify to jury irregularities that involved "extraneous prejudi
cial information" and "outside influence."120 The Supreme Court
forwarded this formulation of the rule to Congress.
The confusion that predated the Advisory Committee's original
formulation 121 remained extant. The House believed that the origi
nal committee draft, which embraced the Iowa rule, was the
sounder approach.122 Both the House Judiciary Committee and its
Special Committee on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws rec
ommended the broader version to the House. 123 Conversely, the
post-trial hearing into the conduct of the juror's deliberations.
[d. at 33, 654-55.
117. See notes 58-67 supra and accompanying text.
118. Letter of Aug. 9, 1971, Dep. Att'y Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst to Judge
Maris:
[wle disagree with the comment in the Advisory Committee's Note, that there
is a trend toward allowing jurors to testilY about everything but their own
mental process ... Strong policy considerations continue to support the rule
that jurors should not be permitted to testify about what occurred during the
course of their deliberations. Recent experience has shown that the danger
of harassment of jurors by unsuccessful litigants warrants a rule which
imposes strict limitations on the instances in which jurors may be ques
tioned about their verdict.
117 Congo Rec. 33,648, 33,654-55 (1971).
119. See Draft of FED. R. EVID. 606(b), 56 F.R.D. 183,265 (1973).
120. [d.
121. See notes 109-113 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Letter from Prof. Ronald L. Carlson to Rep. William Hungate:
[tlhe committee's 1969 preliminary draft allowed inquiry into objective juror
misconduct ... and the quotient verdict was not insulated from attack. This
approach was continued in the 1972 draft, the last draft circulated to the
public before submission to the Supreme Court. Then in 1972, apparently
just prior to submission to the Court, the committee did a turn-about and
limited juror testimony to "outside" influences, insulating from attack jury
misconduct which occurs inside the jury room. The committee's first notion
was the sounder approach.
Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
145, 163-64 (1974).
123. The committees believed that the Supreme Court version of Rule 606(b)
would bar juror testimony of a quotient verdict or testimony about a drunken juror.
H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (Nov. 15, 1974), reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 247-48 (1975).
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Senate Judiciary Committee, persuaded by the public policy inter
ests articulated in Pless, 124 preferred the Supreme Court version of
the rule. 125 The narrow exclusionary rule endorsed by the Senate
was the formulation chosen by the Conference Committee. 126
The legislature attempted to accommodate the policies which
protect the jury system and those policies designed to ensure a fair
trial in light of serious malfunctions in the jury's deliberative pro
cess. This balance is embodied in rule 606(b). Essentially, the rule
is a restatement of the majority position reflected in the preceding
case law. The rule, however, reflects a choice and a decision to
support a narrow exclusionary rule rather than the broad Iowa
rule. Further, the legislative history clearly buttresses public policy
as the sole foundation for the exclusionary rule,127 Nevertheless,
the ultimate result of the rule is a set of new labels without param
eters or guides to application. The old labels for admissible juror
evidence, "extraneous influence" and "overt acts," became "extra
neous prejudicial information" and "outside influence." The former
version of inadmissible evidence, "inhere in the verdict," was re
cast in terms of"affecting mental processes." This lack of specific
language was the mechanism used by the drafters to foster case-by
case development of the law. 128 The previous one hundred year
development of a body of case law which lacked a cogent founda
tion had resulted in the confusion and imprecision that confronted
Congress. Rule 606(b), while clarifying a few matters,129 had the
same result.

124. 238 U.S. at 267-68. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
125. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Congo 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974):
[als it stands then, the rule would permit the harassment of former jurors by
losing parties as well as the possible exploitation of disgruntled or otherwise
badly motivated ex-jurors.
Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness re
quires that absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and
free debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts. Jurors will not be
able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in
post-trial litigation. In the interest of protecting the jury system and the citi
zens who make it work, rule 606(b) should not permit any inquiry into the
internal deliberations of the jurors.
126. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93rd Congo 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in
28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 248 (1975).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
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THE PRIVILEGE ApPROACH

The Juror Privilege

The arguments and votes of jurors are protected from disclo
--- is waived. 130 As noted earlier, there are
sure unless their privilege
four requisite elements to establish this privilege. 131 The fourth
prong of the privilege suggests the appropriate public policy in
quiry: the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal at litigation. 132 Thus, the recogni
tion of a juror privilege does not mean it is absol4te and without
exceptions.
Essentially, exceptions may be secured by three mechanisms
within the privilege. First,
[t]he privilege takes as its postulate a genuine relation, honestly
created and honestly maintained. If that condition is not
satisfied, if the relation is merely a sham and a pretense, the ju
ror may not invoke a relation dishonestly assumed as a cover and
cloak for the concealment of the truth. 133

Second, and most unlikely, the community may decide that the
privacy and secrecy of jury deltberations are unnecessary to pro
mote a just and honest jury system. 134 Finally, the court may de
termine through a balancing process that other policies raised by
the particular case are more important. 13S
Just as promulgating a privilege does not extinguish its excep
tions, designating the privilege's exceptions does not renounce the
privilege. The doctrine was born in 1670 in Bushnell's Case 136
"with its historic vindication of the privilege of jurors to return a

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
which in

289 U.S. at 12.
See text accompanying note 76 supra.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2346, at 678-79.
289 U.S. at 14.
The third prong of the privilege requires that the relation must be one
the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2285, at 527.
135. The fourth prong of the privilege requires that the injury that would inure
to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal at litigation. ld.
136. 124 Eng. Rep. (135 Vaughan) 1006 (C.P. 1670). In that case the jurors found
a verdict of acquittal, and in doing so did not follow the judge's instructions. They
were fined and imprisoned but were discharged on habeas corpus. ld.
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verdict freely according to their conscience. "137 This ancient princi
ple, transformed into statutory form, had the same effect:
A juror shall not be questioned [for any verdict rendered by
him], and is not subject to any action, or other liability civil or
criminal, . . . in an action in a court of record, or not of record,
. . . except by indictment, for- corrupt conduct, [in rendering
such verdict, 1 in a case prescribed by law. l3S

The juror's privilege seldom is used to decide juror impeach
ment problems. The juror's ability to waive his privilege and testify
about matters that public policy rationales demand remain silent is
one noted problem that deters judicial recognition of the privi
lege. 139 One commentator noted another problem: "what is said
between jurors is seldom relevant upon a new trial and what is dis
closed in an affidavit is usually not in the nature of communication,
but rather a statement of misconduct which is not always protected
by the principle of privilege."14o Moreover, the Court and Con
gress have preferred to use public policy grounds for the exclusion
ary rule. 141 It is difficult, however, to distinguish those public pol
icy arguments from the fourth part of the privilege, which balances
the benefit to the litigant against the potential harm to the jury
system. 142 Nevertheless, the juror privilege has been abandoned as
a tool for decision in the juror impeachment area. One reason for
this lack of recognition is an interpretation of the leading case,
Clark,143 as limited to its facts. 144

B.

Application of the No-Impeachment Rule

A dissection of rule 606(b) shows that the exclusionary princi
ple protects: (1) Any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations; (2) the effect of anything upon his
or any other juror's mind or emotions; and (3) the juror's mental
processes. 145 As noted earlier, Congress deliberately cast the rule

137. 289 U.S. at 16.
138. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 14 (McKinney 1976).
139. Carlson & Sumberg, supra note 77, at 253.
140. Note, Impeachment ofJury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 258, 263 (1970).
141. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
143. 289 U.S. at 1.
144. United States ex rei. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 820 n.7 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
145. See note 30 supra.
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in broad terms to promote case-by-case development of the law.
The categories clearly are redundant. As a result of both this re
dundancy and the lack of specific language in the rule, courts have
decided the impeachment issue without assigning the fact pattern
to one of the three categories above. The exceptions to the rule are
equally ambiguous. Juror impeachment of the verdict is allowed on
the issues of "extraneous prejudicial information"146 and "outside
influence. "147
1.

Inadmissible Juror Evidence

Rule 606(b) takes as its form the rule disallowing juror im
peachment and two major exceptions. 148 In all the following in
stances the juror's testimony would be excluded under both rule
606(b) and the privilege approach: (1) When one or more jurors
misused any portion of the evidence in the case;149 (2) when one or
more jurors speculated on matters of common knowledge not
raised during the trial;150 (3) when a juror exchanged his vote on
one issue to gain another juror's support on a different issue;151 (4)
when the jury delivered a quotient verdict, a verdict arrived at by
adding together each juror's assessment of the damages and divid
ing that amount by the number of jurors;152 and (5) when a juror
speculated that the defendant would receive a suspended sentence
or a quick parole.1 53 This evidence is excluded by rule 606(b) be
cause it concerns the jury's deliberative process and the juror's
mental process. In contrast, juror evidence in these fact patterns
would be excluded by the privilege through balancing the possible
harm· to the litigant against the possible harm to the jury process.
Because perfect jury performance is an unreal expectation, any
kind of juror misconduct must be examined in that context. Disclo
146. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 984 (1962).
150. Gault v. Poor Sisters of St. Frances, 375 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1967) (fore
man's suggestion to the jury to compare soundness of business policy of keeping
pregnant woman on her job past her seventh month of pregnancy, with a policy al
lowing women to work through their seventh month of pregnancy was inadmissible
to impeach the verdict).
151. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. at 347.
152. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. at 264.
153. Klimes v. United States, 263 F.2d 273 (D.C. App. 1959) (proper to deny
new trial despite a juror affidavit alleging that another juror stated that the accused
probably would be sentenced to probation and would not go to prison anyway).
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sure of juror communication in any of the above situations would
promote restricted and inhibited discussion. Ultimately, that ill
could cause the greatest damage to the jury system. It would force
each individual juror to think in a vacuum without the aids of con
sensus and argument. Thus, the process easily could be abolished
in favor of automatic nonjury trials.
Rule 606(b) and the privilege, however, part company in sev
eral other instances. Under rule 606(b) juror evidence that the jury
set a time limit for its deliberation is inadmissible. 154 Clearly, this
is a circumstance, under rule 606(b) , where such information was
predetermined as nonprejudicial if not trivial. Thus, the method of
analysis assumes that if the matter is unimportant no inquiry is
necessary. This juror conduct fits into one of the exclusionary cate
gories "[if] any matter or statement occur[s] during the ... delib
erations. . . . "155 Under the privilege approach, however, the
slight, adverse impact this information would have upon the poli
cies bolstered by rule 606(b) would weigh in favor of admitting the
juror evidence. Inquiry into this kind of conduct would help further
the result so staunchly defended by the rulemakers, a rational and
just jury verdict. Unfortunately, this kind of fact situation aptly
illustrates the general approach of rule 606(b): To try to preserve
the. remaining vestiges of a jury process without a prospective view
toward improvement.· Under the privilege approach, information
about setting a time limit would be admissible because the jury
system cannot possibly be harmed if such conduct is exposed. 156
The result under rule 606(b) and the privilege approach would
differ when a juror misunderstands 157 or ignores the judge's in
structions 158 or misunderstands the requirement of a unanimous
verdict. 159 These fact patterns fit into the "mental processes" cate

154. Capella v. Baumgartner, 59 F.R.D. 312 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (motions for new
trial denied when plaintiff suggested that the jury may have agreed to reach a verdict
by a certain time and hour).
155. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
156. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
157. Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977), (after verdict
was returned for defendant in a product liability suit, evidence that one juror tried to
convince the other jurors to find for the plaintiff because many things :m the market
are substandard was inadmissible to support misunderstanding of judge's instructions
concerning assumption of risk and product misuse).
158. Capella v. Baumgartner, 59 F.R.D. 312 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
159. United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Pa.), afI'd, 545 F.2d 864
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977) (that jury did not hear instruction
that verdict had to be unanimous was impermissible to impeach the verdict).
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gory of rule 606(b) , 160 which excludes juror evidence on this ques
tion. 16l Any chilling effect an inquiry into this kind of misunder
standing would have on freedom of debate in the jury room 162
would be vastly mitigated by the openness fostered between judge
and jury. Jurors would feel more comfortable to ask the judge for
another explanation, thus enabling them to reach a just verdict.
After balancing the various interests, the privilege approach would
deem this information admissible.
A third problem faced by rule 606(b) and by the case law de
velopment of the exclusionary principle 163 is that of categorization
without thought to the specific set of circumstances at bar: any ju
ror evidence of a compromise verdict is barred by the rule. 164
Thus, testimony that a juror traded his vote on liability for lower
damages 165 and testimony that a juror agreed to anything so that
he could leave for vacation on time 166 are both excluded by the
same rule barring juror evidence of a compromise verdict. Both
rule 606(b) and the privilege agree on the exclusion of juror evi
dence in the first situation. Compromise and bargaining are impor
tant parts of the jury process, and such a line would be difficult
and dangerous to draw. 167 On balance, jury protection is more im
portant than diclosure. The exclusion of evidence concerning the
second situation, however, is merely matching the result with an
exclusionary label, "compromise verdict." This kind of labeling
does violence to the jury system. It counteracts the instruction
given to jurors to use a rational process and thwarts any attempt to
criticize that kind of conduct in the future.
A corollary to the categorization problem is the difficulty of fit
ting a particular circumstance into one category of rule 606(b) or
another. The most prevalent dilemma in this area surfaces when

160. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
161. Often times a juror examination on this question is unnecessary due to the
devices used in Rule 49 of the FED. R. OF CIV. P., special verdicts and general ver
dicts accompanied by interrogatories. See note 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
162. 289 U.S. at 13.
163. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
164. Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the JudiCiary, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
165. Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (D.C. Pa. 1976) (note from one
juror stating that during the damage phase of the trial, another juror believed that the
jury's answers to the interrogatories would negate all blame and thus, traded his vote
on negligence for lower damages was impermissible to impeach the verdict).
166. Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977).
167. See notes 196-98 infra and accompanying text.
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the verdict is apparently a result of racial or ethnic prejudice. 16S It
is difficult to label this evidence excludable under the "mental
process" category or admissible under the "outside influence" cate
gory. The privilege approach offers two methods of dealing with
the prejudice situation. If the juror lied about his biases or preju
dices on voir dire, the privilege will not protect him because the
relation was not honest. 169 Alternatively, as a general proposition it
may be true that judicial inquiry into juror prejudice cleanses and
purifies the jury process. Within the context of the jury system,
however, no juror is likely to enter the deliberative process with
out personal biases. Thus, the balance in favor of the jury or liti
gant can go either way. The approach of rule 606(b), to attach one
of its dogmatic labels to this kind of juror evidence, is fruitless. 170
The focus of the inquiry must rest on whether, in the particular
case, the juror's prejudice offended the principles of fundamental
fairness afforded the litigants.
One further weakness in rule 606(b) has been identified by the
commentators: "[T]hat a threat or act of violence was brought to
bear [by one juror] upon . . . [another juror] to reach that ver
dict. "171 Concern has been expressed correctly that such evidence
of a threat would be barred by rule 606(b). Under the privilege ap
proach, such evidence would be admissible under the same
guiding principle which admits evidence that a juror lied on voir
dire 172 01' accepted a bribe. 173 This rigorous coercion of one juror
by another negates the basic postulate of the privilege, the creation
of an honest relation. 174
The preceding section considered the divergence of result and
process between the modem federal rule and the juror privilege.
The different outcomes are due largely to a focus on particulars

168. Smith v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978)
(evidence that a juror mimicked black defense counsel and black defendant was inad
missible to impeach the verdict); United States ex rei. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d
934 (3rd Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 913 (1953) (denying habeas corpus relief to
petitioner, who alleged that one juror was prejudiced against Italians); Cherensky v.
George Washington-East Motor Lodge, 317 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (new trial
denied despite fact that plaintiff was told by one juror that the verdict was based on
anti-Semitic prejudice).
169. 289 U.S. at 14.
170. See text accompanying notes 163-64 supra.
171. Carlson v. Sumberg, supra note 77, at 274.
172. See notes 206-211 infra and accompanying text.
173. Id.
174. 289 U.S. at 14.
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rather than labels and to a view toward prospective policy concerns
rather than only present jury protection. The process of measuring
one policy against another via a rational framework is valuable in
mitigating the judge's uncircumscribed and discretionary power to
overturn jury verdicts and order new trials. The problems of la
beling and categorization and of unbridled judicial power will re
surface in the next section. The next section, however, will focus
on the confusion between the different constitutional mandates for
criminal and civil trials and the different brands of juror miscon
duct.
2.

Admissible Juror Evidence

The two major exceptions to rule 606(b) are showing "extrane
ous prejudicial information" and "outside influence. "175 Agreement
on result between the rule and privilege is scant on the first excep
tion and almost unanimous on the second.
Essentially, the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception
concerns extra-record or inadmissible evidence considered by the
jury to reach its verdict. 176 As such, this evidence directly conflicts
with a criminal defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights.
The sixth amendment guarantees an impartial jury and the right to
confront witnesses. l77 The development of the law governing juror
testimony in the criminal situation has resulted in a cogent analysis
focusing on the particular issue in the case.1 78
The Supreme Court addressed this sixth amendment issue in
Parker v. Gladden,179 where defendant sought an appeal based on
statements made by the bailiff to the jury.180 By condemning
defendant, the bailiff became a witness against him. Because his
"testimony" did not originate "from the witness stand in a public
courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's
[confrontation rights], "181 a constitutionally mandated trial was
lacking. 182 Although the issue of admissibility of juror evidence was

175. See text of Rule 606(b) in note 30 supra.
176. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
177. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 12 (1970).
178. See text accompanying note 199 infra.
179. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
180. The trial court found that the bailiff's comments, in the presence of the
jury were: "Oh that wicked fellow, he is guilty and if there is anything wrong [with
the verdict] the Supreme Court will correct it." Id. at 363-64.
181. Id. at 364.
182. Id.
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not directly addressed in Parker, 183 the bailiff's comments involved
such a high probability that prejudice would result that the trial
was found "inherently lacking in due process. "184
The judiciary interpreted Parker as creating a "newly articu
lated federal right. "185 Thus, in People v. Delucia,186 the Second
Circuit reversed the lower court decision, which relied on the
Mansfield rule, that a juror cannot impeach his own verdict. 187 On
remand, the juror affidavits alleging an unauthorized juror visit to
the scene of the crime were held admissible to impeach the verdict
because the subject matter constituted an inherently prejudicial
outside influence: "[when] the Supreme Court holds that a particu
lar series of events, when proven, [violated] a defendant's constitu
tional rights, in that determination is the right of the defendant to
prove facts substantiating his claim. "188 The court's confrontation
clause rationale, however, evolved into a more specific inquiry into
"the nature of what has infiltrated to the jury and the probability of
prejudice. "189 The ultimate result has been to protect juries and
criminal defendants alike.
This new approach crystallized in United States ex reI. Owen
v. McMann. 190 Unlike DeLucia and Parker,191 this case did not in
volve an outside force but involved comments made by one juror
to another about defendant's past record. 192 After an evidentiary
hearing, the district court set aside the conviction based on the
deprivation of defendant's constitutional confrontation rights. 193
The court of appeals affirmed the decision but not the process. 194
Judge Friendly noted that jurors do not become unsworn witnesses
within the scope of the confrontation clause the moment they
183. The Court did consider the affidavit of one juror which supported the trial
court's finding that the communication was prejudicial to the defendant. In reversing
the Oregon Supreme Court, the juror evidence considered was a statement by the ju
ror that she was prejudiced by the bailiff's remarks. Id. at 365 n.3.
184. Id. at 365.
185. United States ex reI. Owen v. McMann, 373 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1967).
186. 15 N.Y.2d 294, 206 N.E.2d 324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
821 (1965), on reargument, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
187. Id. at 296,206 N.E.2d at 325,258 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
188. People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d at 279, 229 N.E.2d at 214, 282 N.Y.S.2d at
531.
189. United States ex rei. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
190. Id.
191. See text accompanying notes 180 and 188 supra.
192. 435 F.2d at 815.
193. Id. at 815-16.
194. Id. at 817-18.
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"[pass] a fraction of an inch beyond the record of evidence.... "195
The Owen approach recognizes the impossibility that a jury could
ever be "a laboratory, completely sterilized and free from any ex
ternal factors"196 and that no constitutional deprivation results
when "jurors with open minds were influenced to some degree by
community knowledge. . . . "197 Jury consideration of this kind of
information was part of the rationale for the constitutionally pro
tected right to a jury trial. 19S
This inquiry, articulated in Owen, found further support in the
Fifth Circuit:
[w}e cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opin
ions of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies.
. . . Nevertheless, while the jury may leaven its deliberation
with its wisdom and experience, in doing so it must not bring
extra facts into the jury room. In every criminal case we must
endeavor to see that jurors do not [consider} in the confines of
the jury room . . . specific £acts about the specific defendant
then on trial. 199

Thus, the resolution of the juror impeachment issue in criminal sit
uations resembles the privilege approach. Resolution is not de
pendent on proper or improper labeling but rather on a balance
between possible harm to the jury system and the need for particu
lar information to fulfill constitutional mandates. The problem
arises, however, when this balance is applied cavalierly to civil
cases without regard to the particular issues raised.
Reliance by the civil judiciary on the criminal juror impeach
ment standard, coupled with a congressional attitude to shuttle
civil cases through the courts, has resulted in disparate results in
the area of the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. Un
fortunately, civil cases have applied the label "extraneous prejudi
cial information" without considering its meaning. In civil cases the
term includes matters specifically noted in the criminal cases as out
side the "extraneous prejudicial information" category. Thus, evi
dence that jurors have consulted general books about drug traffic2°o
195. Id. at 817.
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dis
senting)).
198. Id. See also Broeder, the Impact of the Vicinage Requirements: An Em
.
pirical Look, 45 NEB. L. REV. 99, 101 (1966).
199. United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 922 (1970) (emphasis deleted).
200. Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820
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and driver manuals 201 has been admissible. Further, jury ver
dicts have been overturned based on the presence of inadmissible
evidence without an inquiry to determine prejudice. 202 Surely, if
criminal courts faced with a constitutional mandate require evi
dence of prejudice before overturning the verdict, civil courts are
under no less of an obligation.
The approach in civil cases has been to categorize such things
as "unauthorized experiment"203 or "accidentally discovered evi
dence"204 as "extraneous prejudicial information." The effect of this
process is to delete the word "prejudicial" and make the exception
include only "extraneous information." As clearly noted in Owen:
"[t]here is no rational distinction between the potentially prejudi
cial effect of extra-record information which a juror enunciates on
the basis of the printed word and that which comes from his
brain. "205 Thus, the extraneous nature of extra-record information is
not nearly as important as its potential for prejudice. The privilege
approach would take the juror's knowledge and apply the balancing
process: Protection of the jury versus the litigant's right to a fair
trial with the focus on possible prejudice rather than on the partic
ular brand of juror misconduct.
The second major exception to the exclusionary rule permits
juror impeachment of verdicts when evidence of an improper out
side influence is shown. 206 Essentially, this exception is applied in
cases of juror bribes,207 threats to jurors,208 and juror use of nar
coticS. 209
(1973) (new trial granted where books on drug traffic, drug problems, and people in
volved with drugs were found in the jury room as allowed by the judge).
201. Stiles ·v. Lawrie, 211 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1954) (new trial ordered when
driver manual was used by jury to determine speed of vehicle from length of skid
marks).
202. United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1945) (allowing all corpo
rate records in court to be received in evidence although they contained inadmissi
ble notations was error even though no prejudice could be determined).
203. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE 135 n.57 (1979) .
. 204. [d. at 135 n.56.
205. 435 F.2d at 820.
206. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
207. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (new trial ordered when
jury foreman was approached with a bribe); Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160
F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947) (mentioned bribery as a matter
upon which juror affidavits may be received (dictum)).
208. Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924
(1978) (new trial ordered when juror and his family had been threatened three times
and juror had been and his family had been threatened three times and juror had
been assaulted).
209. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 764 (1947).
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The privilege approach is in accord with these results. Any
matter or event that may impugn the juror's honesty negates the
privilege. 21o This rubrick also may be used effectively to uncover
evidence of one juror coercing another211 or of an insane juror. 212

V.

CONCLUSION

Juror impeachment notions sprouted from a serious concern
for protecting the jury system's privacy. A jury free from scrutiny
and criticism is the traditional model capable of rendering rational
and just jury verdicts. When a litigant challenges the jury's verdict,
he raises doubts about the process and the factors used by the ju
rors to reach their verdict. Further, a litigant's challenge reminds
the court of his rights and, by implication, the need to consider
these rights as part of the decision to admit or exclude juror evi
dence.
Originally, Lord Mansfield's rule raised a total bar to juror im
peachment of the verdict. This rule was modified by Congress to
allow juror impeachment in certain circumstances. Congress's at
tempt in rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to accommo
date the conflicting interests of jury and litigant protection has
failed. The broad language of rule 606(b) , specifically designed to
foster case-by-case development of juror impeachment law, para
doxically has raised further barriers to the accommodation process.
Cases arising since the enactment of rule 606(b) have defined
three vague categories within the rule. The rule sets out three cat
egories where juror evidence is excluded: (1) Any matter or state
ment occurring during the deliberations; (2) the effect of anything
upon a juror's mind or emotions; and (3) the juror's mental process.
The courts, however, have been unable to discern the parameters
of each exclusion. In addition, due to the broadness of each cate
gory many courts have been content merely to label the particular
juror misconduct. This same problem applies to the two exceptions
in rule 606(b) which admit juror evidence upon a showing of: (1)
Extraneous prejudicial information or (2) outside influence. The
problems of vagueness in the rule and eager labeling by the courts
have resulted in disparate decisions in particular and the lack of a
cogent doctrine in general.
210. 289 U.S. at 14.
211. See text accompanying notes 171-74 supra.
212. United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 829 (1974) ("absent substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence," courts are
unWilling to subject jurors to a hearing on mental condition).
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Congress promulgated rule 606(b) to resolve conflicting inter
ests. It is improper to apply the rule without reference to the poli
cies that originally prompted the juror impeachment rule. To fa
cilitate the implementation of these policies, Congress and the
courts should adopt a juror privilege approach for juror impeach
ment problems. Recognition that a process is required to balance
these policies is an important first step. The fourth prong of the
privilege, which balances protection of the jury against the desire
for a fair disposal of litigation, is the keynote of this process.
Rather than label particular brands of juror misconduct, the
courts should address the policies presented. The value of
delineating one policy over another through a rational balancing
process is substantial. The balancing approach of the' privilege
would result in more consistent and fair decisions. The use of this
approach would mitigate the judge's discretionary power to over
turn verdicts. Further, the privilege approach considers prospec
tive improvement of and potential harm to the jury system, unlike
rule 606(b) which deals only with present concerns. The courts and
Congress must act in a manner parallel to the reality of a
crumbling jury system, a system without proper guidelines or en
couragement to reach a just verdict. Merely buttressing a crum
bled building is insufficient when a new foundation is required.
Lisa A. Prager

